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Senator John McCain (R-AZ) has proposed two major changes to the corporate tax code: cutting the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 25 percent and allowing corporations to deduct the full cost of  investments in technology and equipment 
in the first year, an accounting process known as expensing. The first proposal aims to 
enhance U.S. economic competitiveness, create jobs, and increase wages. The second 
proposal aims in particular to boost capital expenditures and “reward investment in 
cutting-edge technologies.”1
Both measures, if  enacted by Congress, would greatly alter the role of  corporate rev-
enues in our tax system. Corporate taxes account for a significant share of  the federal 
government’s revenues (about 14 percent in 2007),2 financing critical investments in 
national defense, infrastructure, and human services. The corporate tax is crucial for 
the overall progressivity of  the tax system, prevents individuals from sheltering income 
in corporations, and enables some measure of  regulatory control over corporations.
There are major problems with the corporate tax code, of  course, such as the provi-
sions that encourage U.S. companies to locate jobs overseas. Reforms of  the tax code 
to address these problems—including proposals that would close loopholes and lower 
the corporate tax rate—are worthy of  serious consideration. Some changes, however, 
would make these problems worse. 
This paper examines Sen. McCain’s corporate tax proposals on tax sheltering, growth 
and competitiveness, equity, and cost. In each case this proposal raises significant con-
cerns. Specifically:
Allowing corporations to expense their investments in new equipment and technol- 
ogy, in the context of  the current tax code, invites massive tax sheltering. 
Cutting the corporate tax rate to 25 percent from 35 percent would also drain the  
federal treasury, without improving the competitiveness of  the United States as a 
place to do business or of  its corporations in the global marketplace. 
Reducing the corporate rate will overwhelmingly benefit upper-income taxpayers.  
Combining rate cuts and expensing would be enormously expensive, reducing corpo- 
rate revenues by as much as 75 percent. 
Center for American Progress Action Fund
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The McCain Proposals Invite a Wave of New Tax Shelters
Sen. McCain’s proposals would create a new generation of  tax shelters that are im-
mune from legal challenge. Currently, companies depreciate—deduct from their corpo-
rate taxes over several years—the costs of  capital investments. Sen. McCain proposes to 
allow a 100 percent current deduction, also known as expensing, for these capital invest-
ments, reducing corporations’ taxable income dollar-for-dollar. 3 
In other words, rather than deducting a part of  the cost of  a new machine in the year 
of  the purchase, McCain would allow companies to deduct the entire cost in that year. 
Basic tax classes teach the uncontroversial proposition, known as the Cary Brown theo-
rem, that expensing for capital investments results in normal corporate profits, or profits 
earned in a competitive marketplace, being taxed at a zero rate. Intuitively, this means 
that only so-called above-normal profits (monopoly profits) will be subject to the corpo-
rate tax, and most corporations will not pay tax most of  the time. 
The sheltering opportunity arises because Sen. McCain proposes expensing in the 
context of  the current corporate tax structure, including the deduction for interest 
when a company takes out a loan to purchase equipment. This means the company 
may deduct the interest on that loan. Sen. McCain’s proposal would mean that a com-
pany could immediately deduct not only the interest on the money borrowed to buy a 
machine and part of  the machine’s cost, but the full cost of  the machine itself. 
This combination would open up almost unlimited opportunities for sheltering income. 
In fact, for many corporations, the proposal would result in a negative effective tax rate 
on many investments—rather than paying a tax on profits the corporation would get 
money from the government in addition to their profits.
Here’s how it might work. Suppose Acme Corporation borrows $1,000 with a 10 per-
cent interest rate and invests it all in new equipment. Under the McCain plan, Acme 
can deduct its $1,000 of  investment, resulting in a reduction of  its tax bill by $250 
(assuming a 25 percent corporate tax rate under the other provisions of  McCain’s cor-
porate tax proposal). Acme can then invest the $250 and earn an extra $25 (assuming 
a 10 percent interest rate). Under normal competitive conditions, it will also earn $100 
(10 percent) on its $1,000 investment, which would result in $25 of  tax, or the same 
amount it earns on investing the tax refund.
Senator McCain’s 
Corporate Tax Proposals
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The upshot: The corporation’s effective 
tax rate is zero. But if  Acme can also 
deduct $100 of  interest on its loan, the 
effective tax rate becomes negative. At a 
25 percent rate, the company will be able 
to avoid paying $25 in taxes on another 
$100 in income. Of  course, borrow-
ing terms will shift over time, as will the 
amount of  money a corporation could 
earn by lending out its tax savings under 
McCain’s 100 percent depreciation pro-
posal. But the bottom line remains an 
enormous tax shelter. 
On its face, McCain’s idea is similar to 
one of  the proposals advanced by Presi-
dent Bush’s Tax Reform Advisory Panel, 
the “Growth and Investment” tax proposal, 
which likewise would have allowed expens-
ing of  corporate capital investment. But 
the Advisory Panel proposed to ignore all 
financial flows, resulting in no deduction for 
interest.4 The Panel described the elimina-
tion of  the interest deduction as “essential.” 
Specifically, the Panel said that: 
“Allowing both expensing of  new 
investments and an interest deduction 
would result in a net tax subsidy to 
new investment. Projects that would 
not be economical in a no-tax world 
might become viable just because of  
the tax subsidy. This would result in 
economic distortions and adversely 
impact economic activity.”5
To understand the context of  McCain’s 
depreciation proposal, it is useful to 
review the recent history of  tax sheltering. 
In 1981, President Reagan enacted one 
of  the biggest effective corporate tax rate 
cuts by adopting super-accelerated depre-
ciation deductions and an investment tax 
credit that together were equivalent to 
the expensing McCain is now propos-
ing. Reagan, like McCain, did nothing to 
limit interest deductibility. 
The result was a wave of  tax shelters. 
Individuals borrowed heavily, used the 
borrowed funds to invest in ways that 
benefited from expensing, and deducted 
the interest. The combination of  expens-
ing and interest deductibility resulted in a 
negative tax rate for these shelters. Cor-
porate income tax revenues plummeted 
to 1.5 percent of  Gross Domestic Prod-
uct by the end of  1985, from 2.4 percent 
of  GDP in 1980.6 
Congress brought the individual tax 
shelter wave to an end in 1986, limiting 
interest deductibility for individuals and 
enacting the at-risk and passive activity 
loss rules (which segregate losses from 
passive activities and prevent them from 
sheltering active income).7 The McCain 
proposals invite a new round of  shelter-
ing like that of  the 1980s. Taking advan-
tage of  these proposals will not require 
extensive legal or accounting help. The 
shelters will be very simple to adopt.
And once again, new loopholes in the 
corporate income tax could spill over into 
the personal income tax. In an environ-
ment in which the personal income tax rate 
stays at 35 percent (or higher, if  Congress 
refuses to extend the Bush tax cuts at the 
highest income levels), there would be 
massive incentives to shift income from the 
individual to the corporate sector. 
An important justification for maintaining 
a corporate tax is that individuals would 
otherwise be able to shelter their income 
in corporations and defer the individual 
tax indefinitely. The weapons that the 
Internal Revenue Service can use to com-
bat such shifting, such as the accumulated 
earnings tax and transfer pricing, are 
hopelessly inadequate. 
Thus, it is likely that the result of  enact-
ing Sen. McCain’s proposal would be a 
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decline in not only corporate tax rev-
enues, but in individual income tax rev-
enues as well. In fact, President Reagan’s 
1981 corporate tax cuts had to be quickly 
reversed in the face of  larger than 
expected revenue losses.
Tax Changes to Promote 
Growth and Competitiveness 
Will Aid Neither
Sen. McCain justifies cutting the corpo-
rate tax rate by arguing that a rate cut will 
improve growth that is “essential to U.S. 
competitiveness.” He states that “America 
was once a low-tax business environment, 
but as our trade partners lowered their 
rates, America failed to keep pace, leaving 
us with the second-highest rate among the 
world’s advanced economies.”8 
The broad argument about growth is 
not compelling. Recent experience indi-
cates that corporate rate cuts, like the 
temporary reduction in the tax rate on 
dividends from foreign subsidiaries from 
35 percent to 5.25 percent, have resulted 
in increased profits for U.S. corpora-
tions but no increase in jobs or overall 
economic growth.9 It is true that the 
United States now has the second-highest 
nominal corporate tax rate, but two facts 
suggest that the nominal tax rate does 
not diminish the competitiveness of  the 
United States or U.S. corporations. 
First, the effective tax rates in most other 
countries—the rates actually paid—
are now higher than here. Second, we 
do not currently tax U.S. corporations’ 
foreign-sourced income—or income 
from outside the United States—which 
means reducing the corporate tax rate 
is irrelevant to competitiveness against 
foreign corporations. Both of  these 
points merit detailed exploration.
Comparing Tax Rates 
The key determinant for competitiveness 
is not the nominal corporate tax rate, or 
the rate on paper, but rather the effec-
tive rate—the rate companies actually 
pay. Deductions for interest payments 
and investments can reduce actual taxes 
as a percentage of  income well below the 
nominal rate. Companies that actually 
pay more in taxes may be less competi-
tive, but if  companies merely appear to pay 
more but do not, that that has no effect.
In the United States, companies look like 
they are paying more because we now 
have the second-highest nominal tax rate 
(after Japan) among the members of  the 
Organization for Economic Competitive-
ness and Development.10 But the under-
lying story is different. Other countries 
have indeed lowered their nominal rates 
over the last two decades, but their effec-
tive rates did not substantially decline 
between 1986 and 2008. 
In fact, OECD average revenues from the 
corporate tax rose to 3 percent of  GDP 
from 2 percent of  GDP over this period.11 
In contrast, U.S. corporate tax revenue 
declined to between 1.5 percent and 2 per-
cent of  GDP in the late 1990s to 2003 
before rebounding sharply to 3 percent of  
GDP from 2003 to 2006 (the last year in 
which complete data are available).12 
Thus, the argument that we need to 
reduce our corporate tax rate because 
our trading partners have reduced theirs 
does not make sense. Our trading part-
ners have reduced their nominal rate, but 
they have also broadened their corporate 
tax base by taxing more kinds of  income, 
reducing deductions and credits, or some 
combination of  the two. Sen. McCain’s 
proposal to slash the corporate tax rate 
to 25 percent and introduce 100 percent 
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expensing would, in contrast, sharply 
reduce the corporate tax rate and narrow 
the base, resulting in a much lower effec-
tive tax rate in the United States than 
among our main trading partners. 
The Impact of Tax Rates on 
Corporate Competitiveness
The U.S. corporate tax rate is also irrel-
evant to the competitiveness of  U.S. com-
panies abroad because it does not apply 
to U.S. corporations’ overseas earnings. 
When U.S. corporations compete with 
foreign corporations overseas, they can 
avoid paying U.S. corporate tax on their 
active business income by choosing to 
defer those taxes. 
In fact, the overall tax burden on U.S. 
corporations’ foreign operations is very 
low precisely because they take advan-
tage of  tax holidays and other techniques 
to minimize their foreign tax burden. 
Reducing the U.S. corporate tax rate has 
no impact on these operations.
Similarly, the U.S. corporate tax rate is 
irrelevant to operations of  foreign cor-
porate competitors in the United States 
because both U.S. and foreign businesses 
face the same tax rate—the U.S. corpo-
rate tax rate. Reducing U.S. corporate 
tax rates, even if  it were a true cut in the 
effective tax rate, would have no impact on 
the competitiveness of  foreign vs. U.S. cor-
porations. Competitiveness is not an argu-
ment for cutting the U.S. corporate tax rate. 
Proposals Undercut  
Tax Progressivity
Who benefits when taxes on corpora-
tions are cut? The longstanding assump-
tion of  both the U.S. Department of  the 
Treasury and the Congressional Budget 
Office is that the corporate tax falls on 
shareholders in the short run and on all 
capital providers (investors in the corpo-
rate and non-corporate sectors) in the 
longer run because capital flows from the 
corporate to the non-corporate sector.13 
But the incidence of  the corporate tax 
has been debated for the last 50 years. 
One of  Sen. McCain’s economic advisors, 
American Enterprise Institute Senior Fel-
low Kevin Hassett, argues that corporate 
taxes are “in large part” passed on to 
labor through lower wages and therefore 
corporate tax cuts “can” increase wages.14 
The important word is “can.” How likely 
is it that U.S. corporations will pass a tax 
cut through to their employees?
To address this question, we need to 
know why a corporate tax cut might be 
passed on to wage earners. The obvious 
answer is that because of  the decline in 
union membership and the increase in 
globalization, wages have become more 
elastic (responsive to changes). Corpora-
tions can cut wages in response to corpo-
rate tax hikes because there are no unions 
to threaten a strike, and because they can 
credibly threaten to move jobs overseas if  
the workers do not accept pay cuts. 
But these same factors mean that the 
corporations are highly unlikely to pass 
the benefits of  tax cuts to their employ-
ees. Instead, corporations would probably 
accumulate increased profits. After all, U.S. 
corporations in recent years have boosted 
their cash reserves, engaged in expensive 
share buybacks to please shareholders, and 
boosted the pay of  corporate executives—
amid one of  the least enriching business 
cycles for average wage earners. 
The beneficiaries of  any corporate tax 
cuts would be corporate management, 
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who would be able to further boost their 
pay packets drawing from larger piles 
of  cash, and shareholders. In fact, using 
increased profits to raise wages when there 
is no economic compulsion to do so would 
contradict corporate management’s obli-
gation to increase value for shareholders.
The argument that cutting the corporate 
tax rate will lead to wage gains is also 
inconsistent with the standard argument 
for the recent tax cuts on dividends and 
capital gains that Sen. McCain would 
retain. The standard argument for these 
tax cuts is that the corporate income 
underlying dividends and capital gains 
has already been taxed at 35 percent at 
the corporate level. If  Sen. McCain and 
his advisers are right that the cost of  
corporate taxes to companies is mostly 
shifted to labor, then what is their justi-
fication for taxing dividends and capital 
gains at 15 percent, less than half  of  the 
rate for ordinary income? If  labor pays 
most of  the corporate tax, then owners 
of  capital should be taxed on both divi-
dends and capital gains at or near the full 
individual rate. 
The Cost to the  
Federal Budget
Sen. McCain’s chief  economic adviser, 
former Congressional Budget Office 
director Douglas Holtz-Eakin, estimates 
that the reduction of  the corporate tax 
rate by itself  would cost the Treasury 
$100 billion a year. This figure, however, 
is probably low because it does not take 
into account the sheltering activity that 
is made possible by the combination of  
expensing and interest deductibility. 
Len Burman, co-director of  the Tax 
Policy Center, estimates that the rate 
reduction and expensing together would 
cut corporate tax revenue for the federal 
government in half, an estimate that he 
says is “probably conservative.”15 Another 
approach to the estimate is to use the 
2003 revenues. That is when the most 
recent corporate tax shelter movement 
was at its height. In 2003, corporate tax 
revenues were only $132 billion. Against 
that benchmark, the McCain rate cut 
would amount to a 75 percent reduction 
in corporate tax revenues.16 
The problem with such deep cuts in 
revenues is, of  course, that if  we want to 
avoid an exploding deficit—and McCain 
has promised to erase the deficit by the 
end of  his first term—then he needs to 
find spending cuts to offset the revenue 
reductions. McCain has indicated he 
would consider eliminating the Sec-
tion 199 tax credit for “manufactur-
ers” (defined broadly to include software 
writers, construction firms, and archi-
tects), the low-income housing credit, and 
unspecified tax breaks for life insurers, 
credit unions, and exporters.17 
Each of  these programs, however, boasts 
strong lobby groups, and some have 
problematic distributive consequences. For 
example, trading the low-income housing 
credit for a corporate tax reduction seems 
particularly egregious. Thus, it seems 
highly unlikely that a President McCain 
could or should be able get all of  these tax 
revenue enhancing measures past Con-
gress. Even if  he could, these provisions 
would raise only a fraction of  the revenues 
needed to pay for his tax cuts. 
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Conclusion
Corporate taxes are a critical source of  revenue for the nation. They provide a barrier against massive personal income tax avoidance. And they are part and parcel of  our nation’s progressive tax traditions. Sen. McCain’s corporate tax 
proposals shatter each of  these important attributes of  the U.S. corporate tax system 
without providing much at all in the way of  increased U.S. corporate competitiveness or 
wider economic prosperity. 
Instead, Sen. McCain’s proposals would mark the beginning of  a new wave of  tax 
shelters, contribute little to growth and competitiveness, heavily benefit higher-income 
taxpayers, and lead to unaffordable losses in revenue. 
The U.S. economy performed quite nicely in the 1990s, with record growth in productiv-
ity and a decrease in income inequality. There is no credible evidence that restoring the tax 
rates that prevailed in that era (39.6 percent for individuals, 35 percent for corporations, 
with the full individual rate applying to corporate dividends) would impede U.S. economic 
growth or competitiveness. The result would be a much more equitable distribution of  the 
tax burden, and a real chance to eliminate the current federal budget deficit. 
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